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Unfair Representation as an Unfair Labor Practice
In its 1962 Miranda Fuel Co. decision,1 the National Labor Relations Board formulated a novel doctrine whereby it acquired

1. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co.,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See note 8 infra and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction over unfair representation complaints filed by union
members in good standing on the theory that a union which fails to
represent all of its members fairly commits unfair labor practices in
violation of sections 8(b)(l)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act.2 Formerly, unfair representation complaints filed by
union members had been cognizable only by the courts,3 since unfair
representation was not considered an unfair labor practice and,
consequently, was outside the jurisdiction of the NLRB.'
Section 8(b)(l)(A) provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their section 7 rights "to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
. . . or to refrain from any or all such activities." Since a labor organization is charged with the duty of acting as bargaining agent for all
employees in the bargaining unit, nonunion as well as union
workers, 5 arbitrarily inequitable treatment of unaffiliated workers
constitutes the archetypal section 8(b)(l)(A) violation. 6 This form of
unfair representation impinges on a worker's right to remain unaffiliated, but in Miranda the Board was presented with the allegedly
unfair representation of a union member in good standing. Nevertheless, the Board,7 having determined that the union had acted
arbitrarily and unfairly in successfully urging the employer to reduce
the seniority of the complainant, found a section 8(b)(l)(A) violation by interpreting the section 7 right to choose representatives as
implicitly including the right of union employees to be represented
fairly.
Section 8(b)(2) is violated when a union causes or attempts to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in such a
manner as to encourage or discourage union membership or partici2. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (Wagner Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1958)
(Taft-Hardey Act).
3. The right to fair representation was judicially extracted from § 9(a) of the act.
See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Whitfield v. United Steelworkers, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959); Syres v. Oil Workers,
223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 892 (1955). But cf. Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp.,
195 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1961). See generally Herring, The "Fair Rep-resenta•
tion" Doctrine-An Effective Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination?, 24
Mo. L. REv. 113 (1964); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (1964).
4. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 49 Stat. 553 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958),
provides that the NLRB shall have jurisdiction over unfair labor practices listed in
§ 8, 49 Stat. 552 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp.
V, 1964), affecting commerce.
5. This obligation derives from § 9 of the NLRA, which provides that the
statutory bargaining agent shall be the exclusive employee representative. See, e.g.,
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147
F.2d 69, 74 (5th Cir. 1945).
6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Hughes Tool Co. v.
NLRB, supra note 5.
7. Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning dissented.
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pation in union activities. 8 An employer is prohibited from so discriminating by section 8(a)(3). Although Miranda involved a union
member in good standing, the Board, finding the union's action to
be unjustified and arbitrary, held the successful insistence that the
seniority of one of its members be reduced was an 8(b)(2) violation
on the theory that this demonstration of the ability of the union to
wield arbitrary power would force nonmembers, or members in poor
standing, to take an active part in union affairs in order to avoid
incurring union hostility. 9
On review, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit refused to enforce the Board's decision in Miranda, Judge
Friendly dissenting.10 Judge Medina, writing the majority opinion,
was joined by Judge Lumbard in determining that the union had
not acted unfairly. The decision also considered and rejected the
section 8(b)(2)-section 8(a)(3) reasoning. 11 Judge Medina alone con- .
sidered, and rejected, the section 8(b)(l)(A) unfair representation
rationale.
Nevertheless, the NLRB reiterated these theories in 1964 in
Hughes Tool Company12. in the context of racially-oriented discriminatory union inaction. The bargaining unit at Hughes Tool
was divided between white and Negro employees into locals I and 2.
At the time these locals were certified as joint bargaining agents,13
a contract in force between the employer and the two locals provided
that certain jobs, including apprenticeships, would be available to
white employees only. When local 2, the Negro unit, refused to
renew this discriminatory contract, local I did so unilaterally. Subsequently, a Negro member of local 2 applied for an apprenticeship
but was rejected on the basis of race. The company refused to hear a
grievance based on this refusal filed through local 2, which according
to the contract had no responsibity in matters relating to apprenticeships. The complainant then sought the assistance of local I in processing the grievance but was summarily refused, and an unfair
representation complaint against the union followed because of the
denial of assistance by local I.
The presence of two locals within one bargaining unit opened
8. See, e.g:, Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 52 (1954).
9. 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 186-88 (1962).
10. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
11. The court determined that § 8(b)(2} could not be violated unless the discrimination sought by the union would constitute a violation of § 8(a)(3) if the
employer had acted on his own initiative. This reasoning may not encompass all
situations. See notes 34-36 infra and accompanying text.
12. Metal Workers, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964).
13. Apparently this segregated unit had been so certified by the NLRB, because
in the course of its decision the Board expressly overruled previous decisions insofar
as they held that unions which practice racial segregation may obtain or retain
certification. Id. at 1294.
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two avenues of approach to the case. If the two locals were viewed as
separate entities, then the refusal of local 1 to process complainant's
grievance on the ground that only members of local 1 were eligible
for apprenticeships constituted a refusal to represent a nonmember
employee in its bargaining unit. The two members of the Board
who had dissented in Miranda chose this approach to find a section
S(b)(l)(A) violation in Hughes Tool. The Board majority, on the
other hand, did not recognize the validity of the division of the
bargaining unit along racial lines. 14 In their view, rather, the case
presented an instance of internal union discrimination in violation
of section 8(b)(l)(A) under the Miranda unfair representation
theory. The majority then broadened the section 8(b)(2) theory of
Miranda. While Miranda condemned certain union action (insistence upon decreasing the seniority of a member), Hughes Tool
held that union inaction (the refusal to process a meritorious
grievance) 15 caused the employer to violate section 8(a)(3).16 Finally,
the Board also added a section 8(b)(3) union refusal to bargain
violation to the list of unfair labor practices which may arise from
unfair representation. The Board reasoned that the duty to bargain
imposed on unions by that section ran in favor of individual members, as well as employers, and therefore failure to represent a member constituted a refusal to bargain.
Valid criticism can certainly be advanced against each of the findings of violation made by the Board in Hughes Tool. Because of the
legislative and administrative history of section S(b)(l)(A), it is unlikely that the courts will uphold the broad reading given that
section by the Board when it fashioned the Miranda doctrine as
reiterated in Hughes Tool. 17 Initially, there is no indication that
Congress intended to include unfair representation within the ambit
of section 8 unfair labor practices. On the contrary, specific proposals
14. See note I!! supra.
15. Not all grievances need be pressed by the union, but the exercise of discretion
must not be totally arbitrary. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
31!! F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D.
Md. 1959).
16. Although the language of the opinion leaves some doubt as to whether, for
purposes of finding a § 8(b)(2) violation, the majority viewed the locals separately
or as comprising a single unit, a more recent decision indicates that the existence of
two locals was immaterial. Rubber Workers Union, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964).
17. The Courts have construed § S(b)(l)(A) broadly so as to include a wide range
of conduct. Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960); Radio Officers v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); NLRB v. United Packinghouse Workers, 274 F.2d 816
(5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. International Ass'n of Woodworkers, 243 F.2d 745 (5th
Cir. 1957). See also Central Mass. Joint Bd., 123 N.L.R.B. 590 (1959). However, the
courts have also defined limits for the provisions of that section. NLRB v. News
Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961) (preferential hiring of union men); Local 357,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (hiring hall arrangement not
~~~~~~-~~~~~•~m~

(minority union picketing for recoguition of exclusive bargaining agent).
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to that end were rejected during consideration of the Taft-Hartley
Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act, and when presented in separate bills
prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 In addition, because the TaftHartley Act both added section 8(b)(l)(A) to the NLRA and
amended section 7 to include as a protected right the option to refrain from participating in any activity protected by that section,
the proscription of 8(b)(l)(A) on unions was apparently simply a
counterpart to the existing section 8(a)(I) of the Wagner Act, which
imposes the same hands-off limitation on employers. Moreover, if
the duty of fairness is read into the other section 7 rights as the
Board read it into the right of employees to choose their own
representatives, much of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act is redundant,19 with the result
that, although that act specifically designated the courts to hear
complaints arising under it,20 the Board will be given almost
concurrent jurisdiction. Many commentators have agreed that
the Board's interpretation of section 8(b)(l)(A) is unwarranted,21
and prior to !Jfiranda the Board's General Counsel had expressed
the same belief in refusing to present unfair representation cases to
the Board.22 A bill recently introduced in Congress by Representative Griffin also appears to assume that unfair representation is not
presently an unfair labor practice. This bill, entitled "Employee
Civil Rights Act of 1965,"23 was prompted by current enthusiasm for
repeal of legislation enabling states to pass right to work laws and
is intended to guarantee that workers who are required to join a
union as a condition of employment will not be discriminated
against by that union on the basis of race. It provides specifically
that it is to be an unfair labor practice for a union to represent unfairly its members because of racial considerations.24
Second, the position that unfair representation constitutes a
refusal to bargain by the union is subject to similar objection since
it seems clear that section 8(b)(3) was designed only as a counterpart
18. See generally Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 721 (1964).·
19. LMRDA (Bill of Rights), §§ 101-05, 73 Stat. 522-23 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 4II-15
(Supp. V, 1964). See generally Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VAND. L. REv. 547, 588-89
(1963).
20. 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. V. 1964).
21. Albert, supra note 19, at 549-52; Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2
VILL. L. REv. 151, 153 (1957); Herring, supra note 3; Maloney, Racial and Religious
Discrimination in Employment and the Role of the NLRB, 21 Mo. L. REv. 219, 230-31
(1961); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62
CoLUM. L. REv. 563, 590-94 (1962). But see Sovern, Race Discrimination and the NLRA,
N.Y.U. 16TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3 (1963).
22. Case No. K-311, 37 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1956); Case No. 1047, 35 L.R.R.M. 1130
(1954); see also Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953).
23. Employee Civil Rights Act of 1965, H.R. 4350, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
24. Ibid, See Ill CONG. REc. 1993 (Feb. 4, 1965).
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to section 8(a)(5), which requires employers to bargain with unions.25
Both sections should be read in conjunction with section S(d), which
defines "to bargain collectively" as the mutual obligation of employers and unions to meet in good faith to work out differences. 26
Presumably, union insistence upon discriminatory conditions in a
colle_ctive bargaining agreement would violate the union's duty to
bargain since it would be a demand for violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,27 and, perhaps, even without resort to the Civil Rights
Act it would constitute an illegal bargaining technique. 28 The violation would not, however, stem from unfair representation. The
Hughes Tool trial examiner, whose opinion was adopted by the
Board, arrived at his finding of an 8(b)(3) duty running to individual
members by analogizing to a case which he felt established an employer's duty under section 8(a)(5) to bargain with individuals as
well as the union.29 That case, however, was concerned only with the
fact that a union need not be certified to be a recognized bargaining
agent30 and does not support the examiner's position. Indeed, there
are severe limitations on the ability of an individual to bargain with
his employer,31 and an employer's willingness to bargain with an
individual employee in the face of these limitations may itself constitute an unfair labor practice.32 Moreover, even if an employee
were to bargain individually, he could not compel an employer to
meet with him.aa
Finally, the Board's contention that a union attempt to cause
an employer to discriminate against a union member in good standing violates section 8(b)(2) is unlikely to weather judicial review,
despite its apparent logic. The Board recognized in Miranda that
the union's conduct would violate section 8(b)(2) only if the action
taken by the employer at the union's urging violated section 8(a)(3).
The Board also recognized that an employer's motive to encourage
25. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 'F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 1963).
26. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486-88 (1960).
27. See notes 43-50 infra and accompanying text.
28. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Sovern, supra note 21,
at 589.
29. Louisville Ref. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 844, 860-61, enforced, NLRB v. Louisville
Ref. Co., 102 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1939).
30. See also, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961).
31. Two provisos to § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958), permit an employee to
take his grievances directly to the employer only if the bargaining agent has first
had an opportunity to present the grievance, and then only if the terms of the
collective bargaining contract permit such direct bargaining. See J. I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
32. Cf. Federal Tel. &: Radio Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 649 (1953).
33. See administrative rulings of the NLRB General Counsel: Case No. 418, 31
L.R.R.M. 1039 (1952); Case No. 317, 30 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1952); Case No. 255, 29
L.R.R.M. 1339 (1952).
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or discourage union membership is requisite to a section 8(a)(3)
unfair labor practice. Further, it was established by the United States
Supreme Court in Radio Officers v. NLRB 34 that this motive
may be inferred where, in the absence of a valid business reason for
the inequitable treatment, the circumstances indicate that the foreseeable result of the employer's discrimination will be to influence
union membership.35 The Supreme Court also stated that any arbitrary treatment of employees at the urging of the union would
naturally tend to have that effect, since it would demonstrate the
power of the union. 36 Radio Officers, therefore, established that an
act, which if done by the employer on his own initiative might not
violate section 8(a)(3), may become a violation simply because the
employer had acquiesced in an arbitrary union demand. In Miranda
the Board found as a fact that the union's demand was unjustifiable,
and reasoned that the employer's acquiescence brought the case
within Radio Officers.
The nature of this inference made by the Board, however, differs
from that drawn in Radio Officers. In that case and companion
cases, 37 it was patently clear that the union was urging discrimination
in order to coerce employees to join the union or to perform supposed obligations of membership.38 The effects of the urged inequities were also easily ascertainable since in one instance the union
obtained a higher pay scale for union workers than for other employees;39 in another instance the seniority of a member was reduced
for failure to remit union dues; 40 and in the third case the union
successfully sought the discharge of a member who allegedly had not
complied with certain union rules and procedures. 41 Since the
various employers had no reasonable business purpose for discriminating, and since they were, or should have been, aware of the
union's illegal purpose in making the demand and its obvious impact
on the workers, they were deemed to have intended the foreseeable
consequences of their conduct. In effect, the clearly culpable union
motive was imputed to the employer. In Miranda, however, not only
is the illegal coercive effect of inequitable treatment of a union member in good standing conceptually speculative, but also the Board had
to indulge in drawing an inference from an inference by first inferring
a culpable union motive and then inferring that the employer was
aware of that motive. The courts, at least, have generally been un!14.
!15.
!16.
!17.
Co. v.
38.
39.
40.
41.

!147 U.S. 17 (1954).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 52.
NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Gaynor News
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
Id. at 52.
Gaynor News Co. v. NLRB, supra note 37.
NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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willing to find a section 8(a)(3) violation by inference unless the inequitable treatment is reasonably likely to coerce union membership
and there is no other reasonable conclusion but that it was intended
to do so. 42 No such finding can be confidently asserted in Hughes
Tool. Finally, in a case such as Hughes Tool, where the employer has
taken no action violative in itself of section 8(a)(3) and the union has
urged nothing, there is certainly no justifiable basis for finding an
8(b)(2) infraction.
Isolated instances of unfair representation such as that alleged
in Miranda have not elicited public concern and, indeed, no similar
case has been heard; but several subsequent racial discrimination
cases have come before the Board.43 Wholesale discrimination
against a significant proportion of the labor force on racial grounds
has prompted specific congressional response in the form of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,44 which imposes the duty of fair
employment practice on both employers and labor organizations.
T-he act forbids labor organizations to discriminate, to limit employment opportunities, or to affect adversely the employment status of
any member on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, or to attempt to cause an employer so to discriminate. In
order to insure effective enforcement, the act also affords grievants
the same advantages of flexibility and minimal cost which NLRB
hearings have over normal court proceedings,45 subject to the provision that appropriate state and local authorities shall be accorded
the opportunity to act before the commencement of federal action. 40
A Fair Employment Opportunity Commission has been established
with powers to investigate, to seek settlement through conciliation,
and to file complaints with the offending organization either on the
Commission's own initiative or on behalf of a complaining party. If
efforts to achieve an amicable settlement fail, an aggrieved person
may file suit in federal court, with the aid of appointed counsel and
without cost in appropriate circumstances.47 The remedies available
42. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); NLRB v. Adams
Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1964), vacated, 85 Sup. Ct. 613 (1965), Comment, 32
U. Cm. L. REv. 124 (1964).
43. Rubber Workers, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964); Automobile Workers, 57 L.R.R.M.
1298 (1964); Locals 1367 & 1368 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 57 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1964).
44. 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
45. See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism, 61 MICH.
L. R.Ev. 1435, 1514 (1962); Herring, supra note 3, at 162-63.
46. This provision, although laudable as an attempt to preserve state remedial
procedures, has the drawback of delaying the implementation of Title VII actions
in the instances where they are most needed-where state and local authorities are
ineffective.
47. However, because of the limited circumstances in which costs are recoverable,
the heavy financial burden on the plaintiff makes a Board remedy preferable in
this respect. Robert L. Carter, General Counsel of NAACP, N.Y. Times, July 3,
1964, p. 1, col. 6. On the other hand, the Attorney General may be permitted to
intervene in private actions upon certification that they involve matters of general
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through the courts are the same as those available through the
NLRB: injunction and appropriate affirmative relief, including reinstatement with or without back pay, and the Commission is empowered to sue for enforcement where necessary.
The Civil Rights Act has specifically designated the federal
courts as the proper forum to hear Title VII actions and it is unlikely that concurrent jurisdiction in the Board was contemplated.48
Moreover, no court action may be instituted until the state fair
employment agencies have been afforded an opportunity to remedy
the alleged discrimination. This endeavor to preserve the efficacy
of state fair employment practice laws will be seriously jeopardized
if the NLRB is permitted to assume jurisdiction of unfair representation complaints, since the Garmon rule49 establishes, as a constitutional pre-emption principle, that a case involving conduct
"arguably" protected or prohibited by the NLRA must initially be
heard by the NLRB to the exclusion of state courts and state law.50
The Civil Rights Act will not, of course, encompass a Miranda
situation. Congress, however, has not acted to make the terms of
collective bargaining agreements reviewable by the Board,51 but
rather has expressly chosen to avoid federal interference in internal
union affairs and to allow a wide range of discretion to bargaining
agents.52 Therefore, whether the alleged unfair representation of a
union member in good standing results from affirmative union action or from union inaction, or whether the discrimination springs
from racism or from personal animosity, the Board's usurpation of
the legislative function should not stand.

public importance, or he may bring his own suit when he has reason to believe
that rights guaranteed under Title vn are being violated without redress.
48. Contra, Rubber Workers, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964).
49. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 286 (1959).
50. Because of the holding in Hughes Tool, a New York court has applied the
Garmon rule in holding that a state court no longer has jurisdiction over unfair
representation cases. Goni-Moral v. Marley, 58 L.R.R.M. 2087 (1964).
51. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 861 U.S. 477, 486-88 (1960).
52. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 845 U.S. 830 (1953); Union News Co. v. Hildreth,
295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). That the injection of the NLRB more directly into
the bargaining process on the Hughes Tool theory will tend to restrict the baigaining agent's discretion is evident from the decision in Rubber Workers, 57 L.R.R.M.
1585 (1964), wherein the Board found that the union had exceeded its discretionary
privilege not only in refusing to discuss better job opportunity for Negroes, but also
in :refusing to process a grievance relating to segregated washrooms.

